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Full text of "Poland Russia and Great Britain 1941-1945"

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moment when the Germans were triumphant over Soviet Russia. The
stability of Poland's eastern frontier, the eastern frontier of the * British
World ' in Soviet eyes,, had been trampled down,
Churchill's Government curtailed its role as the Ally of Poland, merely
supporting her in the war against Germany, and contrary to the very
spirit and letter of the 'Mutual Agreement/ refused to support her against
Russian brutality and aggression, acquiescing to the same action on the
part of the Russians which that identical British Government had con-
demned in the Germans. London restricted its activities in the Russo-
Polish dispute to advice freely tendered to the unfortunate Polish
Government^ gradually withdrawing meanwhile from every position and
giving in to every Soviet demand. From the very first instance., the
helpless Polish Government, with its complicated problem of the masses
of its people deported to the U.S.S.R., was left to fend for itself against
the Kremlin. When the climax of the war on the Eastern front was
reached^ and when Russia had passed over to an attack against the
Germans in the field and to an attack against the Allies in the diplomatic
arena, the Kremlin no longer had any need to continue discussions with
the Polish Government and forthwith severed relationship. However,
London continued to use it as means for further bargaining with the
Soviets, in an attempt to gain concessions from the Kremlin in other
terrains. The U.S.S.R. was finally able to achieve the recognition by
the Big Two of its puppet c Lublin Committee.' How this entire
procedure was manoeuvred by the Soviets has already been recounted in
detail . . . the blackmail of the Allies, the British lack of vision regarding
the /uture of Europe . . . Roosevelt's idea of dividing the world into
three Empires—were the main items from which with the utmost political
craftsmanship Moscow extracted every ounce of advantage.
It would be unjust not to admit that the British Government did,
in all sincerity^ endeavour to save the independence of Poland, but it was
also obvious that it had no real intention of intervening in full strength
and, by defending Poland's freedom and the freedom of the Baltic States,
in other words the first rampart of the Western World, save the freedom
of Europe. Churchill, did not grasp the implications which, as repre-
sentatives of that Europe, were underlying the Polish reasoning. And
moreover, for some time at any rate, he also did not get the full implica-
tion of Stalin's words, and later apparently, did not wish to understand ...
His exaggerated fear complex—of Moscow achieving a separate peace
with Hitler, effectively paralysed from its embryonic stage, any British
endeavours to support Poland and her neighbours against Russian
prevalence. Churchill frantically clutched at Russia's plan of * com-
pensation ' for Poland at the cost of Germany^ giving Britain's sanction
to the loss of Eastern Poland, although the western half of that country was
not to be saved by this move. British diplomacy virtually had the ground
swept away under its feet by this decision, and was dragged in the wake